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7Chaper 1
Propaganda and “Realpolitik.” T. G. 
Masaryk and His Attitude towards 
Hungary and the Magyars during and 
after World War I
Dušan Kováč 
(Institute of History at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia)
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk started his resistance activities against 
Austria-Hungary with the aim of creating an independent Czechoslovak state 
immediately at the start of World War I. The assassination in Sarajevo caught 
him while on a family holiday in Germany (Bad Schandau). In Germany, he 
experienced the mobilization that made a good impression on him with its pre-
cision and organization which was in sharp contrast to what he later experi-
enced in Prague. Although at fi rst he had not believed that a world confl ict 
would really break out, when it happened, he immediately realized that a great 
war in Europe would also decide the fate of Central Europe, which would also 
be the fate of the Czechs and Slovaks.1 He thus observed the mobilization and 
the fi rst battles very carefully. From the beginning, he considered the options, 
economic, military and political potentials of those countries that were fi ghting. 
He published his refl ections in a study called Válka [War]2. A month later, anoth-
1 MASARYK, T.G., Světová revoluce. Za války a ve válce 1914 - 1918. Vzpomíná a 
uvažuje. Praha: Orbis a Čin 1925, p. 10-12. English translation: The Making of a 
State. Memories and Observations. With introduction by Henry Wickham Stead, 
London 1927.
2 MASARYK, T.G., Válka a revoluce I. Články - memorandá - přednášky - rozhov-
ory 1914 - 1916, Spisy T.G.Masaryka svazek 30 (ed. Karel Pichlík, Dagmar Hájková 
and Richard Vašek) Praha 2005: Ústav T.G.Masaryka, o.p.s., Masarykův ústav AV 
ČR, p. 11-27. Paper originally published in Naše doba on 20th August 1914, p. 961-
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er essay, this time not signed by Masaryk, was published in Naše doba [Our 
Age] dealing with the economic potential of the countries at war.3 It was quite 
surprising that the war censorship allowed these articles to be published, since 
they were far from patriotic. In his comments, using the language of numbers, 
Masaryk soberly, even drily, weighed the positive and negative aspects of both 
of the military groups. The economic indicators were particularly in favour of 
the Triple Entente, mainly in the case of a long-lasting war. These refl ections 
were somehow drowned out by the common opinion that Germany and 
Austria-Hungary were going to win the war quickly, as many still remembered 
the short Franco-Prussian War.
The possibility of the Triple Entente winning the war encouraged Masaryk 
to be active, because, in this case, resistance on the side of the Triple Entente 
could have led to the division of Austria-Hungary and the formation of indepen-
dent states from its ruins. Masaryk started working towards this plan and his 
fi rst memorandum, formulated by the British journalist Robert William Seton 
Watson, which was sent to the powers of the Triple Entente through the British 
government, originated as early as October 1914 during his interviews with Se-
ton Watson.4 This memorandum already represented a comprehensive program 
for the formation of the Czechoslovak state that is a unifi cation of the countries 
of Czech St. Wenceslas’ crown and the parts of Hungary populated by the Slo-
vaks.
Masaryk’s decision was a great surprise to many of his contemporaries 
who learnt of his plan, since pre-war Masaryk had been better-known as a fi erce 
critic of Czech nationalism and its program of “the renewal of Czech statehood” 
in the Czech milieu. His specifi c political program followed more in the foot-
steps of František Palacký and his “idea of the Austrian state,” because he had 
always rather pushed for Austrian democratization and modernization than for 
its downfall. This surprise could still be seen in newer publications from the end 
979 and later serialized also in Čas.
3 MASARYK, Válka a revoluce. p. 28-34. Article Válka a hospodářství: Hos-
podářský boj Anglie a Německa [The War and Economics. Economic fi ght of En-
gland and Germany] Originally published in Naše doba, 20th September 1914.
4 National Archives London, Public Record Offi ce (PRO), Foreign Offi ce (FO) 
371/1900, pp. 115-124. The interviews took place on 24th and 25th October 1914 in 
Rotterdam.
Chapter 1: Propaganda and “Realpolitik.” T. G. Masaryk and his Attitude towards Hungary and the Magyars during and after World War I  9
of the 1980s.5 As a matter of fact, Masaryk’s “turnaround” was not so sudden. 
As a member of the Reichstag in Vienna, he was able to closely watch not only 
the unpromising policy of the court but also the increasingly radical German-na-
tionalistic policy in Cisleithania and, fi nally, the magyarisation policy of the 
Hungarian governments in Hungary. According to his own testimony, Masaryk 
still did not believe that a military confl ict of such magnitude would break out, 
even when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.6 The war, however, be-
came a reality and the evolutionary development that he had pushed for before 
lost its raison d´être; moreover, there was a threat that a victorious “German 
war” would strengthen German and Hungarian infl uence in Central Europe 
which could have led to catastrophic consequences for the Czechs and Slovaks. 
It was thus a rational analysis of the situation that arose because of the war. 
Masaryk made it quickly, just like he made the decision to lead resistance abroad 
with a goal to gain approval from the Triple Entente politicians for the break-up 
of Austria-Hungary and the formation of the independent Czechoslovak state.
It was not a simple task, since, at the beginning of the war, Masaryk’s plan 
represented more of a utopia than a real political goal in the eyes of Triple En-
tente politicians; moreover, such a plan was also in confl ict with their military 
goals which focused on defeating Germany and they followed a policy of the 
separation of Germany from Austria-Hungary. The plan had, however, been in 
existence since October 1914 and it was necessary to start vigorous activities 
towards its realization.
This was Masaryk’s goal to form a Czechoslovak state. It was a specifi c, 
pragmatic goal. The new state was already given its borders in the fi rst memo-
randum, which was especially important for Slovakia, since there had been no 
fi rm language border between the Slovak and Hungarian populations in Hunga-
ry and no historic border. It was necessary to lead broad-based agitation during 
the war to support this pragmatic plan, especially after the failure of the fi rst 
memoranda. In other words: the Czechoslovak resistance movement needed 
propaganda to be successful.
Propaganda was mainly focused on demonstrating the logic of forming the 
Czechoslovak state. In fact, the formation of the Czechoslovak state necessarily 
5 See GALANDAUER, Jan, Vznik Československé republiky 1918. Programy, pro-
jekty, perspektívy [Emerging of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918. Programmes, 
Projects, Perspectives], Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda, 1988, p. 30
6 MASARYK, Světová revoluce...p. 10.
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meant the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy unlike, for example, 
the formation of the Polish state or expansion of the Romanian or Italian states. 
The Czechoslovak propaganda thus had lead not only with the pragmatic goal of 
forming a new “national state,” albeit the very idea of a national state was prin-
cipal in the propaganda, but it also had to deal with the matter of the new orga-
nization of Central Europe.7 The main motive lay in stopping German expansion 
towards Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, that is the German “Drang 
nach Osten.” New national states, especially the Slavic states of Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia, together with Romania, were to create a barrier against 
German expansionism. Foreign propaganda led by Masaryk thus had a strong 
anti-German bias from the beginning, but, as an area populated by Slovaks was 
also to be part of the new Czechoslovak state, criticism of the Hungarian dena-
tionalization policy was also strongly supported. Propaganda abroad was sys-
tematically organized by Masaryk, always in response to a specifi c situation, 
and used every possible chance to discredit Germany and, particularly, 
Austria-Hungary. This form of propaganda was so effective that the French au-
thor François Fejtö called Masaryk, together with Beneš, “the geniuses of pro-
paganda.”8
In his book Světová revoluce [World Revolution], Masaryk himself offered 
a rather extensive description of the principles of propaganda that the Czecho-
slovak foreign resistance used abroad. Apart from connections with important 
Triple Entente politicians and journalists, a lot of time and effort was devoted to 
public lectures and domestic journalism as well as journalism in selected for-
eign periodicals such as La Nation Tchèque, Le Monde Slave and especially the 
weekly The New Europe. To infl uence small but infl uential and opinion-forming 
groups - this was one side of the propagandistic activities, but the press was the 
main medium. In a circular that he sent to the representatives of societies and 
organizations of foreign countrymen in March 1915, Masaryk defi ned these 
brief principles of propaganda: “1, Seriously pronounce a demand for indepen-
7 On this topic see: HÁJKOVÁ, Dagmar. Role propagandy ve válečných aktivitách 
T. G. Masaryka od vypuknutí války do ledna 1917 [The Role of Propaganda in the 
Masaryk War Activities from Outbreak of the War till January 1917]. Historie a vo-
jenství, XLIX, 2000, no. 1, pp. 14-37.
8 FEJTÖ François, Rekviem za mrtvou říší. O zkáze Rakouska-Uherska, Praha: 
Academia 1998, p. 233. French original: Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de 
la destruction de l A´utriche-Hongrie, Paris 1994.
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dence at special meetings and in the newspapers - both domestic and foreign; 2, 
Maintain relationships with foreign politicians and newspapers; Try to have a 
positive infl uence on Prague, send people and letters there.”9 In Masaryk’s view, 
it was very important for the propaganda to focus on the defence of democracy 
and humanitarian principles, and to mainly be “honest”: “Exaggeration and 
even lies are not benefi cial; there have even been individuals amongst us that 
have considered the art of politics to be the art of trickery, and they have tried to 
spread ‘patriotic lies;”10 It was also this aspect that, according to Masaryk, had 
not only a moral aspect, but also an exclusively pragmatic one, since strong 
German, Austrian and Hungarian anti-propaganda was readily able to contra-
dict such lies, which, of course, weakened the position of the foreign resistance. 
Of course, it was not easy to strictly follow these principles. Even Masaryk 
himself used unverifi ed rumours about the Crown Prince Rudolf and his death 
and about Franz Ferdinand, in his article on the House of Habsburg and its de-
generation. However, criticism of German Pan-Germanism and its goals was 
the main focus of the propaganda. Here, Masaryk relied on his good knowledge 
of German literature itself which was quite open in spreading Pan-Germanism.11 
Variability and fl exibility were important features of the propaganda. It was al-
ways important to know who the foreign resistance was trying to address and 
with what aim. In a sense, the propaganda was thus also subject to pragmatic 
goals and needs.
Masaryk had already started writing his main work devoted to foreign re-
sistance throughout World War I during the war, and, after the war, he fi nished 
it, edited it and published it under the name Světová revoluce. It is interesting 
that the English translation of this work published in 1927 is called The Making 
of a State.12 The difference between the two titles is worth noticing. During the 
war, Masaryk saw the formation of the Czechoslovak state as a part of a world 
democratic and humanitarian revolution, that is in relationship to the changes 
throughout the world. He also saw this process as a part of the formation of a 
9 HÁJKOVÁ, Role propagandy, p. 19.
10 MASARYK, Světová revoluce, p.100.
11 Masaryk, T.G. The Literature of PanGermanism, in: The New Europe 1916, no. 
2-5 and no. 8. 
12 MASARYK, T.G. The Making of a State. Memories and Observations, London, 
1927.
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new Europe.13 The defeat of Germany and the fall of the Russian Tsar verifi ed 
Masaryk’s opinion to some extent. However, the process, which might have ap-
peared this way during the war, was given a different character after it ended, 
due also to the peace talks and peace treaties. The Bolsheviks - Russian, Ger-
man and Hungarian - also laid claim to a world revolution. Only the process of 
forming a new state remained out of the processes in this new post-war situation 
- this had been Masaryk’s starting position at the beginning of the war. So Ma-
saryk accepted the suggestion of Henry Wickham Stead and changed in the 
English translation the title of his work. The entirety of the extensive propagan-
da - published in newspapers, magazines, publications, memoranda, interviews 
with politicians, appearances in important media and, last but not least, the or-
ganization of the foreign army and its successes, which were very adroitly used 
as propaganda - all of these were necessary for the pragmatic formation of a new 
state during the war. It was really important to maintain contact with domestic 
politicians so that they would not deliver loyal speeches at home and negate the 
effort of the foreign resistance, since it was a very sensitive aspect of the entire 
action in a situation where the Triple Entente politicians did not support Ma-
saryk’s plan or did not consider it relevant.
The relationship between “Realpolitik” and propaganda can be easily ob-
served throughout the entire process of foreign resistance led by Masaryk. In 
the fi rst, so called Memorandum of Rotterdam, Masaryk limited himself to a 
plain description of the plan to form the Czechoslovak state, that is the practical 
aspects of formation - borders, currency, form of government and such - and, as 
far as Germany was concerned, he only plainly stated in the memorandum that 
Germany’s defeat in the war was a precondition of the formation of the Czecho-
slovak state: “Without the decisive defeat of Germany there can be no indepen-
dent Bohemia, but with Germany defeated, it can be created to its maximum 
extent. In that case the proper course would be to restore the historical Bohe-
mia-Moravia-Silesia, and to add to this the Slovak districts of Hungary (Slova-
kia).”14
The failure of the Memorandum of Rotterdam convinced Masaryk that the 
plan to form a Czechoslovak state itself was not interesting to the Triple Entente 
at this stage of the war and that it was necessary to vigorously argue for it so that 
13 MASARYK, T.G.: Nová Evropa. Stanovisko slovanské [The New Europe. The 
Slav Standpoint], Praha: Gustav Dubský, 1920.
14 National Archives, London, PRO, FO 371 / 1900, p. 120.
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it would become interesting for the Triple Entente politicians and, in the end, 
acceptable. Thus the propaganda was necessary. Masaryk prepared the New 
Memorandum, called Independent Bohemia, for the British government as early 
as a few months later - in April 1915 - at a time when Russian troops were still 
in the Carpathians. He made much more extensive use of propaganda in this 
memorandum. He knew Germany was the principal enemy of Great Britain as 
well as France. He thus based his propaganda on anti-German rhetoric: German 
imperialism strives to seize control over Central and Eastern Europe and from 
there to the Middle East, thus threatening the interests of Great Britain. Build-
ing the Berlin - Baghdad railway was a symbol of this German strategy. While 
Austria-Hungary was an obedient tool in the hands of Germany, new states 
which will be formed from its remains, including Czechoslovakia, will be able 
to form an effi cient barrier against this German expansion. The Czechoslo-
vak-Yugoslavian corridor, which Masaryk demanded in his memorandum Inde-
pendent Bohemia, was to become a very effi cient barrier against German ex-
pansion: “By forming this Serbo-Bohemian corridor the Allies would prevent 
Germany from colonizing the Balkans and Asia Minor, and they would prevent 
the Magyars from being the obedient advanced guard of Berlin.”15 Hungary and 
the Magyars were thus also included in Masaryk’s line of reasoning. Masaryk 
depicted the Hungarian position before the war and during it as one of a minion 
and as an obedient tool of German imperialistic policy. Such a characterization, 
historically correct in many respects, although it could have been more precise, 
suggesting that Hungarian politicians were actually using their German allies 
for their own interests, systematically appeared in Masaryk’s propaganda. Hun-
gary and the Magyars also appeared as an “independent issue” in the memoran-
dum Independent Bohemia. When accounting for the planned corridor to lead 
through a territory largely populated by the Magyars, Masaryk said: “... it is not 
unjust to claim this district, the more so that the Magyars have treated and con-
tinue to treat the Serbs and Croats in a way worthy of the Huns in the Middle 
Ages. Whole districts are depopulated, the inhabitants of Bosnia driven to Mon-
tenegro, while those of Smyrnia have been sent to Hungary, where they, not 
being cared for, have died in masses. The Slovaks have also been, for centuries, 
the victims of the most brutal Magyarisation.”16
It is interesting that Milan Rastislav Štefánik, who received the memoran-
15 National Archives, London, PRO, FO 371/2241, p. 101-.
16 Ibid., p. 101.
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dum Independent Bohemia from Masaryk, used the very same arguments in his 
own propaganda. It is manifested in his only well-known extensive memoran-
dum, from April 1916 Gli Czechi e l´Italia nella guera attuale.17 Although 
Štefánik used parts of Masaryk’s memorandum in his own, it was primarily 
addressed to the Italian government which, naturally, sent it to the Allies. There 
were parts of it that had obviously been composed by Štefánik, since they are 
written in his expressive style. As far as propaganda related to the Germans and 
Magyars was concerned, Štefánik proved to be an expressive stylist and such a 
style and arguments obviously fell on fertile ground among Italian politicians: 
“It is enough to mention that the newspapers were able to quote thousands of 
executions, mostly of women and children, condemned by trials; but how is it 
possible to express in numbers the dead martyrs when entire villages have been 
massacred by wild hordes of Magyars and Germans?”18
The intense propaganda, where the Magyars were principally mentioned as 
a tool of German Pan-Germanism, carried on in the same spirit during the next 
stage of war. In relation to the matter of responsibility for starting the war, Ma-
saryk depicted the Magyars as supporters of German Drang nach Osten, where 
they, however, played their own role. Masaryk did not fi nd Hungarian policy 
very promising from this point of view, since, in his opinion, the Germans 
would no longer take Hungarian interests into account after winning the war: “It 
is only a German and Magyar minority,19 united by the common desire for pow-
er and hatred towards the Slavs that control the Habsburg monarchy. This hatred 
brings the Magyars into the arms of Prussia which easily accepts their help and 
gives them certain temporary advantages - it even allows them to Magyarize the 
Saxon colonists in Hungary because at the moment Prussia needs the Magyars: 
Prussia knows that once it wins, it can easily relegate them back to a position of 
their choice - among the defeated, sharing the fate of the other subjugated na-
tions.”20
He mentions the Magyars themselves, not as a German vanguard in Cen-
17 National Archives London, PRO, FO 371/2602. pp. 101-106. 
18 National Archives London, PRO, FO 371/2602, p. 102.
19 In this place, Masaryk repeats his main argument against Austria-Hungary: Ger-
man minority oppresses non-German majority in Austria and Magyar minority 
oppresses the non-Magyar majority in Hungary.
20 MASARYK, Válka a revoluce I. p. 225, article Předmluva k publikaci Austrian 
terrosism in Bohemia 
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tral Europe, but mainly as an example of a small nation which has its own impe-
rialistic ideals.21 In several places, Masaryk focuses on the Magyars with respect 
to the historical arguments on the formation of the Czechoslovak state that is 
that it should not only be a new state but a “restored” one, which had already 
existed in the Early Middle Ages, by which he meant Great Moravia. In a secret 
memorandum L´ Europe Centrale Pangermanique ou une Boheme Indépendan-
te? from February 1916, he proposed “the redress of this historic wrong” by 
potentially evicting the Magyars: “The Magyar minority can be evicted, since 
the Magyars did not hesitate to force the Slavic population of Syrmia to move 
out to northern Croatia or to even Hungarian territory… The barbarism carried 
out by the Magyars and Germans in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dal-
matia and Croatia give the Allies the right to punish the offenders.”22 The secret 
memorandum was also part of the propaganda, but Masaryk made a very care-
ful distinction between the arguments designated for the Triple Entente govern-
ments and those given at public lectures. In public, he did not cross the line he 
defi ned in the conclusion of his lecture at London’s King’s College on 7th De-
cember 1915: I do not bear a grudge against my enemies, but I cannot love 
them.”23 The possibility of moving Magyar inhabitants, together with the 
Czechoslovak-Yugoslavian corridor, through the territory of western Hungary 
represented the furthest pole of Masaryk’s program and agitation, which, as he 
found out, was not exactly embraced in London. Despite this, Masaryk tried to 
bring the matter of the corridor forward at the peace conference, but, as it is well 
known, with no success.
The war fi nally ended. At the end, the Triple Entente powers accepted Ma-
saryk’s plan for the formation of the Czechoslovak state, which required a com-
plete political reorganization of Central Europe.
Masaryk tried to clarify the meaning and the course of the struggle for the 
independent Czechoslovak state to Russian legionnaires after the end of the war, 
but at this time the Czechoslovak legions were involved in Russia in the civil 
war. It was to be a state which would have an important role in the newly orga-
21 MASARYK, Válka a revoluce I., p. 127. It is a translation of Masaryk’s inaugural 
lecture at King s´ College University of London: The Problem of Small Nations in 
the European Crisis. 19th October 1915.
22 MASARYK, Válka a revoluce I, p. 190.
23 MASARYK, Válka a revoluce I., p. 184.
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nized Europe. This conclusion led him to write the work Nová Evropa. Stano-
visko slovanské [The New Europe. The Slav Standpoint].24 Masaryk’s views on 
the Magyars and their policy can be seen in this work. Here, he repeated a fa-
mous statement by Camil Cavour that the Magyars fought for their freedom but 
they did not acknowledge the freedom of others. He also stated, based on Robert 
William Seton Watson’s testimony, that the Magyar aristocracy maintained con-
tacts with foreign countries where it manipulated public opinion, and a lack of 
awareness of the actual situation and ignorance of the Magyar language resulted 
in a lack of awareness of the true situation in Hungary. He concluded the pas-
sage dealing with the Magyars by saying: “The Magyars turn all their energy 
against the Slavs, especially against the Slovaks (Magyars saying: Tót nem em-
ber - A Slovak is not a human!), then against the Little Russians, Yugoslavians 
and Romanians; their anti-Slavic instigations, fi nding ready propagators mainly 
in the Viennese press, was largely responsible for this war.”25
Masaryk returned to his homeland as the hero of foreign resistance respect-
ed in both Czech and Slovak society, as the undisputed creator of the new state. 
A pragmatic goal that seemed like a utopia at the beginning of the war was ac-
complished. The state was already internationally acknowledged, although 
peace treaties still had to solve important matters, especially the matter of bor-
ders. An analysis of the entire foreign resistance shows that the making of the 
state was the principal matter for Masaryk and he made both the ideology and 
propaganda related to it subject to this. He pushed for the new state under the 
ideology of a national state abroad, since only such arguments could be success-
ful. The process of forming the nation state of Czechoslovakia thus provided the 
ideological background. Masaryk’s Czechoslovakism in the formation of the 
state was based on the Czechoslovak political nation as a nation composed of 
two ethnic Slavic nations - the Czechs and Slovaks - it was, however, an open 
system. Although we have evidence that Masaryk considered it possible and 
maybe even necessary for the Czechs and Slovaks to become gradually closer in 
matters of culture and language, his Czechoslovakism was a political system, 
not an ethnic one. And it could stay, under certain circumstances, open to other 
nations too.
The political representatives of the new state were faced with new prag-
matic goals: to build the newly formed state as confi rmed by international trea-
24 MASARYK, T.G., Nová Evropa. 
25 Ibid, p. 125.
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ties. It was a state which, apart from Czechs and Slovaks, had over 3 million 
Germans, almost 750 thousand Magyars, Ruthenians, Poles and other nations 
and ethnic groups. It was a state which shared borders with Germany, Hungary 
and Austria. This border was, at least during the fi rst stages, a state border 
which had to be secured and it was also necessary to secure the co-operation of 
the bordering countries. In this new situation political pragmatism directed Ma-
saryk to forget the war propaganda and concentrate on the security of the new 
state. It was clear that the state could not exist in a permanent state of confl ict 
with a large part of its population. Both Germans and Magyars were citizens of 
the Czechoslovak Republic and of the three neighbouring states. The new situ-
ation demanded a change in the rhetoric used until then and a change in the at-
titude towards Hungary as a neighbouring state and towards Magyars as mi-
nority citizens of the new state.
Such a change in attitude could be observed in Masaryk from the fi rst days 
after his return to Czechoslovakia. Already in his fi rst message after he was 
elected president of the Czechoslovak Republic on 22nd December 1918, he 
claimed that minorities would have complete national rights in the new state and 
he specifi cally addressed the Germans and Magyars and asked them to cooper-
ate. He said apropos of the Magyars: “the falseness of their (i.e. Magyar D. K.) 
propaganda has been seen through by everyone and the Allies can clearly see 
today that Magyars only have a right to their national state. I wish our attitude 
towards them could be modifi ed as quickly as possible. The Magyar minorities 
will use all the available civil rights. The Magyars were quite cruel when they 
said: A Slovak is not human - we will not pay them back by doing wrong, we 
only want Slovakia to have borders that will allow it to fl ourish.”26 At the begin-
ning of 1919, that is before the Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary, Masaryk also 
spoke about the organization of Central Europe and how the new states would 
need to become somehow closer both economically and politically in an inter-
view with the Magyar journalist Dr. Leo Margitai. He declared that Hungary 
would be welcome in this new alliance as long as it gave up its aggressive poli-
cy.27 However, Masaryk rejected the Danubian Federation, which was especially 
26 MASARYK, T.G. Cesta demokracie I [The Way of Democracy], Praha: Ma-
sarykův ústav AV ČR 2003, p. 31. Masaryk delivered the passage about Hungary in 
Slovak language. 
27 O našem poměru k Uhrám [About our Relationship to Hungary]. Rozhovor pre 
Déli Hírlap, ibid. pp. 69-72: 
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strong in Austria and Hungary, as a return to the dead Habsburg monarchy and 
preferred building independent states and mutual cooperation. 
Masaryk’s statements apropos of Germans and Magyars in the Czechoslo-
vak Republic present clear evidence that he saw a political Czechoslovak nation 
in an open perspective for all the citizens of the state. Of course, it was neces-
sary that all national minorities, including the Germans and Hungarians, were 
interested in the concept of a political nation. However, German and Hungarian 
politicians in the ČSR during the fi rst years of the existence of the Czechoslovak 
Republic were predominantly negative. They rejected strictly the Czechoslovak 
state. Masaryk presented his vision of Czechoslovakia and its politics by refer-
ring to Switzerland, where citizens of various ethnic groups formed one politi-
cal nation.28 He mentioned the example of Switzerland quite often in his inter-
views with foreign journalists. Even in 1928, on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic, he stated in an in-
terview for Berlingske Tidende: “In Switzerland, the citizens of various nation-
alities united to form a common state. We are doing the same in the Czechoslo-
vak Republic, following the main principles of the League of Nations.”29 At that 
time, Masaryk was, in fact, able to rely on German activism, which had formed 
in the German political camp, as a block, which was willing to cooperate with 
state organisations. The Germans entered the government coalition and had two 
ministers in government. Masaryk was even more precise when expressing his 
idea for the gradual building of the civic state in his speech on the occasion of 
the tenth anniversary of the formation of the republic: “Not only our Germans, 
but also all other citizens, even from our smallest minorities, are our fellow 
citizens and thus will have democratic equality… It is necessary in a democracy 
to have representation of minorities. By all means, it is a task of the majority, 
which gives the state its character according to democratic principles, to win 
minorities for the state. I consider two German ministers entering the govern-
ment the happy beginning of a defi nite agreement.”30
Masaryk’s optimism was, however, too early. Magyar politicians did not 
follow the example of the German activist parties, although they regularly took 
part in parliamentary and municipal elections. However, the end of the 1920s 
28 In an interview for Swiss Tribune de Genève on 20th August 1919.
29 An interview granted to Swen Poulsen on 28th October 1928. MASARYK, T.G. 
Cesta demokracie III., Praha: Ústav T.G. Masaryka, 1994, p. 344. 
30  Ibid, p. 329.
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surely caused a shift and, in a sense, the climax of the tendency to build the ČSR 
civic state. The change in the international situation after Hitler came to power 
in Germany weakened German activism in ČSR and, on the other hand, 
strengthened the revisionist policy in Hungary which, in turn, directly infl u-
enced the policy of Magyar minority representatives.
The relationship between Hungary and the Czechoslovak Republic was, in 
many respects, more complicated than the relationship with Germany. The Wei-
mar Republic was a democratic state and no territorial claims on the territory of 
the Czechoslovak Republic were raised by democratic Germany. From a histor-
ical point of view, the German population of Bohemia and Moravia could rather 
raise claims for the annexation to Austria, which would have been very compli-
cated for the minorities living in the northern parts of the state. In this sense, 
German representatives demanded representation in the Austrian parliament. It 
only made sense, especially to the more active representatives of the northern 
areas, if entire Austria (at that time German Austria - Deutsch Österreich) joined 
Germany. However, the peace agreements prohibited such an annexation, thus 
virtually eliminating the interest of Bohemian and Moravian Germans in join-
ing Austria. On the other hand, Hungary did not give up its political revision-
ism, although it was impossible with respect to real policy. The Hungarian Bol-
sheviks invaded Czechoslovakia and, even though it was just for a short time, 
they occupied parts of southern and eastern Slovakia. Masaryk knew national-
ism also stood behind the ideology of the world’s Bolshevik revolution31 and a 
large proportion of the Czechoslovak public saw it the same way. The relation-
ship between the two countries was already tense after the defeat of the Hungar-
ian Soviet Republic and the border with Hungary was considered more danger-
ous than that with Germany in the 1920s. It was not by chance that it was the 
Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös who paid an offi cial visit to Germany 
after Hitler came to power. 
Complicated international relations, despite considerable progress in real, 
especially economic, policy, did not change anything in Masaryk’s attitude to-
wards the Magyar minority that he was trying to win over to active cooperation. 
He expressed it clearly in an interview for the Hungarian newspaper Hírek in 
June 1920: “The Paris Peace Conference defi ned the rights of national minori-
ties. We, however, want to give the national minorities, which is also the Mag-
31 “The Hungarian Communism is nationalist” - a statement for journal La Cor-
rerspondencia de Espańa: MASARYK, Cesta demokracie I., p. 157.
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yars a skilful, hardworking, honest and good nation, much more.”32 This was 
completely different rhetoric from the one that Masaryk used in his propaganda 
during the war. However, it was again “Realpolitik” that stood behind this 
change in rhetoric. It was not only important for the future of the Czechoslovak 
state to give national minorities all civil rights, but also to win them over to ac-
tive participation in national life and the building of the state with the prospect 
of forming the new political Czechoslovak nation. It is important to say that not 
all Czech and Slovak politicians shared this vision with President Masaryk. The 
European reality of the 1930s also did not give any opportunity to realize such 
a vision. As a realist, Masaryk fi nally had to acknowledge this fact during the 
last years in the presidential offi ce.
It can be said that, Masaryk was especially a realistic politician by nature. 
His “Realpolitik” was limited by principles that he fi nally expanded upon theo-
retically. They were especially general ethical principles, humanism and the 
political principle of democracy. Ideology and propaganda in his political activ-
ity during and after the war were subject to this “Realpolitik.” In relation to the 
Magyars and Hungary, it is well documented by his memoranda, speeches and 
articles. A model thus emerged in international relations and with respect to 
national minorities that, in a sense, exceeded the historical milestones and has 
been, in a way, functional up to the present: Propaganda that aims to support 
real political plans on the one hand and real policy in a space where national 
minorities exist in every state and on the other where neighbouring states have 
to cooperate with each other in the interest of their citizens. 
32 An interview for an editor Emerich Rehberger, 10th June 1920, ibid.
